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Introduction
The law of treaty interpretation presents a familiar paradox. All students of public
international law are at some point taught (perhaps with a wink) that as a matter of
doctrine all treaties are subject to the same unified rules of interpretation—those
principles codified at Articles 31–33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (VCLT), generally understood as reflecting customary international law.1
Yet at the same time, everyone knows that some treaties are special. Time and
again we hear that some kinds of treaties are different. Courts, tribunals, and
scholars often intone that some types of treaties are entitled to special treatment
when it comes to interpretation, especially as regards those changes of circumstances and intentions attending the passage of time. The problem is that the
explanations offered for such differentiation rarely satisfy.
The most common case involves the special nature of human rights treat
ies. Perhaps most famously, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
has extolled the special place of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) as an ‘instrument for the protection of individual human beings’.2 As
the Court famously stated, in Soering v UK, ‘[i]n interpreting the Convention
regard must be had to its special character as a treaty for the collective enforcement of human rights and fundamental freedoms’.3 According to the Court, such
special characteristics call for an outsized reliance on effective interpretation,4
* I am grateful to Ryan Goodman, Eyal Benvenisti, Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Eirik Bjorge, Harlan
Cohen, Anthea Roberts, and Brandon Ruben for invaluable comments and discussion at various
stages.
1 See eg Ulf Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties (Springer 2007) 3; Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (concluded on 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155
UNTS 331 (hereinafter VCLT).
2 Soering v UK (1989) 11 EHRR 439, [87].
3 Soering v UK (1989) 11 EHRR 439, [87].
4 Soering v UK (1989) 11 EHRR 439, [87].
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and justify viewing the Convention as a ‘living instrument’.5 The Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) has similarly emphasized the special nature of
human rights treaties in general, and the American Convention on Human Rights
in particular, finding that such instruments ‘are not multilateral treaties of the trad
itional type concluded to accomplish the reciprocal exchange of rights for the mutual
benefit of the contracting States’,6 and that ‘human rights treaties are living instruments whose interpretation must consider the changes over time and present-day
conditions’.7
Such arguments are not limited to the field of human rights. Similar claims
have been raised regarding the ‘special’ nature of treaties for the protection of the
environment,8 territorial treaties,9 and treaties for the protection of civilians during armed conflict.10
So on the one hand we have the universal Vienna rules, equally applicable to the
interpretation of all treaties; on the other hand we have differential treatment. Faced
with the familiar paradox of accounting for difference under the sign of equality, the
question of the day is how to explain such differential treatment within the law of
treaties. What justifies weighing some rules of interpretation more strongly than others (ie emphasizing object and purpose over text, or vice versa)? When and to what
extent might deviation from the usual rules be justified?
Even in the abstract, the interpretation of treaties over time can lead to doctrinal difficulties.11 Under what circumstances can a treaty change over time? To
what extent can it change on the basis of the parties’ subsequent intentions—as
5 Loizidou v Turkey (preliminary objections) (1995) 20 EHRR 99, [71].
6 Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights (Arts
74 and 75), Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series A No 2
(24 September 1982), [29].
7 The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due
Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series A
No 16 (1 October 1999), [114]. Such views are not limited to human rights courts. For example,
the investor-state arbitral tribunal in RosInvest similarly acknowledged that human rights treaties
are especially amenable to evolutive interpretation—by contrast to the bilateral investment treaty
(BIT) at issue, which was not capable of autonomous evolution. RosInvest Co v Russian Federation
(SCC Case No V 079/2005) Award on Jurisdiction (October 2007), [40].
8 See eg Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros (Hungary v Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, [112]; Pulp Mills
(Argentina v Uruguay) [2010] ICJ Rep 14, Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado-Trindade, [116],
[119]; WTO, US: Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products—Appellate Body Report
(12 October 1998), WT/DS58/AB/R, [130].
9 See Malcolm Shaw, ‘Title, Control, and Closure? The Experience of the Eritrea-Ethiopia
Boundary Commission’ (2007) 56 ICLQ 755, 761 (boundary treaties ‘constitute a special kind
of treaty in that they establish an objective territorial regime valid erga omnes’); Marcelo Kohen,
‘The Decision on the Delimitation of the Eritrea/Ethiopia Boundary of 13 April 2002: A Singular
Approach to International Law Applicable to Territorial Disputes’ in Marcelo Kohen (ed), Promoting
Justice, Human Rights and Conflict Resolution through International Law: Liber Amicorum Lucius
Caflisch (Brill 2007) 767, 772; Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute (Eritrea/Yemen) (1998)
22 RIAA 209, [153].
10 See eg Kupreškić et al (Judgment) ICTY-95-16-T (14 January 2000), [517]–[519].
11 While all treaty interpretation is in some sense ‘interpretation over time’, I employ
the expression here as a shorthand for the question of treaty change or development over time
through interpretation—specifically on the basis of certain codified (or quasi-codified) techniques of interpretation, ie evolutive (dynamic) interpretation and interpretation on the basis of
the subsequent practice of the parties. See further Julian Arato, ‘Subsequent Practice and Evolutive
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evidenced by their subsequent agreement and practice?12 To what extent can a
treaty evolve over time in the absence of authorization by the parties at the time
of interpretation, or even in spite of their intentions to the contrary (‘evolutive
interpretation’)?13 And where these canons conflict with one another, or with the
other components of the Vienna rules, which principles take precedence? These
questions go to the core of the law of treaties—the consent of the parties to be
bound by mutual agreement and the extent to which they remain the masters of
their treaties in the long term.
At the least, if the doctrine of universality is to be believed, the answer to
these questions would remain constant, across treaties of all stripes. Yet we see
frequent attempts to insulate certain kinds of treaties from the potentially shifting
will of the parties, or to classify some ‘special’ treaties as autonomous from their
creators—capable of large-scale evolutionary change more or less beyond the parties’ continued control. These intuitions are often valuable—but as yet it remains
unclear, beyond broad generalizations, what considerations explain and justify
such distinctions in particular cases.
Differential treatment tends to be explained in one of two ways, both of which
prove ultimately unsatisfying. On the one hand, many scholars and tribunals appeal
to the general subject matter of certain treaties in singling them out for special
treatment (eg treaties for the protection of human rights, or the environment).14
In light of their special subject matter, the argument goes, such treaties should be
understood as insulated from the changing will of the parties, and even in some
instances capable of autonomous evolution. On the other hand, the second main
school of thought rejects such generalizations, calling instead for a more particularized approach to treaty interpretation over time based on the object and purpose of the specific treaty in question.15 For the latter group, the touchstone must
always be the intention of the parties, as reflected in the goals their particular
agreement seeks to achieve.
By contrast to the ‘subject-matter approach’, which I suggest creates an unhelpful typology of treaties, I suggest that the ‘object and purpose approach’ goes too
far toward the position that there is no benefit to be gained from thinking about
Interpretation: Techniques of Treaty Interpretation over Time and their Diverse Consequences’
(2010) 9 Law & Prac Intl Cts And Tribunals 443.
12 See Article 31(3)(b) VCLT; see also Georg Nolte (ed), Treaties and Subsequent Practice (OUP
2013); Arato, ‘Subsequent Practice and Evolutive Interpretation’.
13 See ILC, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification
and Expansion of International Law’ (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi) (2006), [478] (hereinafter
the ‘Fragmentation Report’); Eirik Bjorge, The Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties (OUP 2014);
Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘Dynamic (Evolutive) Interpretation of Treaties, Part I’ (2008) Hague YB
Intl L 101.
14 Treaties protecting the human person form a special category, according to one perennial
recital, such as those concerning international humanitarian law or human rights. See eg Theodor
Meron, The Humanization of International Law (Brill 2006); Fragmentation Report, [428]. More
recently one also hears that treaties protecting the environment have a special place: Fragmentation
Report, [250].
15 See Rosalyn Higgins, ‘Time and the Law: International Perspectives on an Old Problem’
(1997) 46 ICLQ 501, 519.
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types of treaties at all (for the purposes of taking a differential approach to interpretation over time). Moreover, the latter approach runs into problems of its own,
related to the difficulty of determining the object and purpose of a treaty or treaty
provision in a meaningful way. I want to propose a middle ground.
This chapter argues that the crucial consideration lies not in the subject matter
of the treaty, nor even purely in its object and purpose, but rather in the nature
of the obligations incorporated by the parties in order to achieve their goals. The
critical question is whether a treaty provision entails a merely reciprocal exchange
of rights and duties, or rather incorporates a more absolute commitment by the
parties to take on an obligation insulated from their changing intentions, and
over which their subsequent mastery might prove relatively limited. The two most
important examples of such absolute (non-reciprocal) obligations are: interdependent norms, meaning obligations of coordination entirely dependent upon the
mutual compliance of all of the parties for their effect; and integral norms, which
may be understood as absolute obligations stricto sensu—norms meant to withstand non-compliance, for which violation requires redress, but never justifies
retaliatory breach by the other parties.16 Whereas a reciprocal obligation entails a
bilateral exchange of rights and duties between two treaty parties, absolute obligations are owed to all the states parties as a collective group (erga omnes partes)
or even to a higher collectivity like the international community as a whole (erga
omnes).17 This typology reflects, in other words, the level of commitment by the
states parties toward achieving their treaty aims. This chapter argues that the type
of obligation is a crucial consideration in the process of treaty interpretation over
time.18
To be clear, I do not want to suggest that the nature of a norm is decisive
for the applicability or non-applicability of any particular technique of interpretation. I am not arguing for a typology of treaty norms that would mechanically determine when and how techniques of treaty interpretation should be
seen as appropriate. I only mean to suggest that the nature of a norm as reciprocal, integral, or interdependent should be a consideration—an important
consideration—in the interpretation of treaties over time. This characteristic
should be taken into account alongside the more familiar factors articulated at

16 In the dramatic words of the ICTY, the notion of absolute obligations marks ‘the translation
into legal norms of the “categorical imperative” formulated by Kant in the field of morals: one ought
to fulfill an obligation regardless of whether others comply with it or disregard it’: Kupreškić, [518].
17 Effect of Reservations, [29].
18 A handful of the more reflective cases stress the centrality of the distinction. See Ireland v
UK (Judgment) (1978) 2 EHRR 25, [239] (‘[u]nlike international treaties of the classic kind, the
Convention comprises more than mere reciprocal engagements between Contracting States. It creates . . . objective obligations’); Effect of Reservations, [29] (‘modern human rights treaties . . . are not
multilateral treaties of the traditional type concluded to accomplish the reciprocal exchange of
rights’); Kupreškić, [517]–[518] (contrasting the ‘absolute nature’ of most IHL treaties to merely
reciprocal commercial treaty norms); RosInvest, [40] (contrasting reciprocal BIT provisions to more
absolute obligations in human rights treaties).
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Articles 31–32 of the VCLT: text, context, object and purpose, subsequent agreement and practice, etc.19
In Part I, I canvass several venerable and more recent attempts to explain (or
advocate) variations in approach to the interpretation of different kinds of treat
ies. While some of these views produce valuable insights, they each prove either
untenable or ultimately incomplete. In Part II, I present a case for grounding differential treatment on the nature of the obligation under interpretation.

I. Old and New Explanations of Difference
This part canvasses three prominent attempts to explain variations in approach to
the interpretation of different kinds of treaties over time, based on: (a) the subject
matter of the treaty; (b) object and purpose; and (c) whether the treaty grants
rights to non-state actors. I suggest that each proves ultimately insufficient. The
first is outright misleading. The object and purpose approach, on the other hand,
is valuable but overly abstract if taken on its own. Only the third approaches
the matter from the right perspective, but it proves to be perhaps too narrowly
confined—its private law focus on third party rights and reliance contains only
a kernel of what I take to be the best explanation (and justification) for affording
certain kinds of treaty norms special treatment in interpretation: the nature and
extent of the obligations undertaken by the parties.

A. Subject matter
The most common justification for taking a differential approach to the interpretation of certain treaties over time has been an appeal to their ‘special subject
matter’, echoing the common refrain that human rights treaties are special because
they concern fundamental human rights.20 Judge Tanaka expressed this view in
now-classical terms in a dissenting opinion to the 1966 South West Africa case. In
calling for the evolutive interpretation of the treaty-basis for the mandate system
in light of a new rule of customary international law, Tanaka explained:
[T]he protection of the acquired rights of the Respondent is not the issue, but its obligations, because the main purposes of the mandate system are ethical and humanitarian.
19 This chapter seeks to account for differential treatment within the voluntaristic structure of
the law of treaties. Of course it is possible to reach beyond the confines of party consent. Though
beyond the scope of the present exercise, it is also well worth reflecting on the possibility some treaties may be entitled to special treatment for reasons completely external to consent—eg by shifting
focus toward the communal or human interests reflected in a particular agreement. See Bruno
Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law’ (1994) 250 Recueil des
Cours 6; Robert Kolb, Interprétation et création du droit international: Esquisse d’une herméneutique juridique moderne pour le droit international public (Bruylant 2006) 202–3; Eyal Benvenisti,
‘Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders’
(2013) 107 AJIL 295.
20 Information on Consular Assistance.
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The Respondent has no right to behave in an inhuman way today as well as during these
40 years. Therefore the recognition of the generation of a new customary international law on
the matter of non-discrimination is not to be regarded as detrimental to the Mandatory, but
as an authentic interpretation of the already existing provisions . . . of the Mandate and the
Covenant . . . What ought to have been clear 40 years ago has been revealed by the creation
of a new customary law . . . 21

At the time it was usually assumed that treaties were static, to be interpreted
strictly according to the so-called inter-temporal rule—requiring that in most
circumstances they should be interpreted in light of the law extant at the time
of promulgation, not at the time of interpretation.22 However, Tanaka here
explained that treaties concerning the rights of the human person must be treated
differently. They must be understood as open to the evolution of general international law concerning the human person. In his view, such treaties should be open
to progressive change in light of developments in customary international law in
the same field. In the intervening decades, various courts and tribunals have confirmed the ‘special’ nature of human rights treaties—that such treaties may have
a more autonomous existence, less in thrall to the mastery of the parties.23 More
recently, similar arguments have arisen in favour of special treatment for treaties
concerning other subjects, ranging from the protection of civilians in armed conflict,24 to the protection of the environment,25 to territorial boundaries.26
Most of the time, such claims that a particular type of treaty is entitled to
special treatment rest on a mere assertion about the importance of the treaty’s
subject matter. The draw of this kind of explanation is at least partially explained
by the diversification and specialization of international courts and tribunals (and
to some extent specialization in scholarship)—in other words, by asking who is
offering the explanation. Increasingly specialized courts have highlighted the
special nature of the treaties over which they have jurisdiction.27 Likewise, not
surprisingly, expert scholars tend to emphasize the special nature of the kinds of
treaties over which they have expertise. Such explanations arise in other settings
21 South West Africa (Liberia v South Africa) (Second Phase) [1966] ICJ Rep 294, Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Tanaka (emphasis added); Higgins, ‘Time and the Law’, 516.
22 See Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v USA) (1928) 2 RIAA 845. In general the rule has been
significantly diluted since Palmas in a wide range of contexts. See Higgins, ‘Time and the Law’,
515–16. But the presumption of contemporaneity nevertheless retains firm adherents. See Dispute
Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) [2009] ICJ Rep 242, Separate
Opinion of Judge Skotnikov; ibid, Declaration of Judge ad hoc Guillaume.
23 See Soering v UK, [87]; Information on Consular Assistance, [114]–[115].
24 See Kupreškić, [517]–[519].
25 See Pulp Mills, Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado-Trindade, [116], [119]; Fragmentation
Report, 250.
26 Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration, [153].
27 The ECtHR and IACtHR, for example, have stressed the special nature of human rights
treaties: Soering, [87]; Information on Consular Assistance, [114]–[115]. Similarly the ICTY has proclaimed the special nature of the Geneva Conventions: Kupreškić, [517]–[519]. See Joost Pauwelyn,
‘A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or Collective
in Nature’ (2003) 14 EJIL 907, 929; Michael Waibel, ‘Uniformity versus Specialization (2): A
Uniform Regime of Treaty Interpretation?’ in Christian Tams, Antoninos Tzanakopoulos, and
Andreas Zimmermann (eds), Research Handbook on the Law of Treaties (Edward Elgar 2014) 375.
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as well, as in the RosInvest arbitration where an investor-state tribunal rejected the
notion that the underlying bilateral investment treaty (BIT) was entitled to any
special treatment. The Tribunal distinguished the BIT from human rights treaties
or the constituent instruments of international organizations, which it deemed
more appropriate candidates for evolutionary interpretation.28 Although many
of these courts, tribunals, and commentators may be right to adopt a differential
approach to the interpretation of their particular treaties over time, it is difficult
to see how subject matter per se does any legal work.29
The most obvious problem with the subject-matter approach is that it tends
to obscure the fact that most treaties, and especially multilateral ones, are
package deals, often touching on multiple areas of law. In the example of the
Fragmentation Report, ‘a treaty on, say, maritime transport of chemicals, relates at
least to the law of the sea, environmental law, trade law, and the law of maritime
transport’.30 If the question of interpretation over time depends on pigeon-holing
legal instruments as ‘trade law’ instead of ‘environmental law’, or ‘human rights
law’ instead of ‘investment law’, then the question of special treatment would be
wholly dependent upon the seemingly arbitrary choice of how to label a complex
treaty.31 It would thus be a good first step to avoid asking why some treaties are
different from others, and ask instead why some treaty provisions are different
from others (bearing in mind, of course, that the context of the rest of the treaty
remains important evidence for interpretation). Any move away from trying to
essentialize a treaty’s sole subject matter, toward inquiring into the subject of the
particular provision under interpretation, would already represent some progress.
However, there is a second, more fatal difficulty with reliance on subject matter as
the touchstone for a differential approach.
The deeper problem with the subject-matter approach is that it ultimately cannot capture much of legal significance—even if we limit our analysis to particular norms. Privileging subject matter simply gives rise to a problem of branding.
Even a single norm can be described as having different subject matters depending on perspective. For example, a BIT provision could be described as being
about protecting foreign investment, about development, or even about human
rights (ie the right to property). Beyond the problem of essentializing complex
instruments, Martti Koskenniemi rightly suggests that ‘characterizations (“trade
law”, “environmental law”) have no normative value per se . . . The characteristics
have less to do with the “nature” of the treaty than the interests from which
it is described’.32 To return to the example of investment disputes, an advocate
for investors’ interests might try to argue that a treaty provision obliging the
state to provide investors with fair and equitable treatment (FET) concerns the

28 See RosInvest, [39].
29 I am only criticizing the tendency in these cases to appeal to subject matter in accounting for
treating some treaties differently. These cases are not always devoid of other, better, reasons. A few
also hit upon the crux of the issue: Effect of Reservations, [29]; RosInvest, [40].
30 Fragmentation Report, [21].
31 Fragmentation Report, [22].
32 Fragmentation Report, [21].
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human right to property, and thus justifies an evolutionary approach (expanding
investor rights). Conversely a state-friendly advocate could just as convincingly
argue that FET represents a concession between states to grant rights to a certain class of individuals to facilitate investment and development—since invest
ors are not party to the treaty at all, there can be no argument that their rights
expand over time to the detriment of the host state’s sovereignty. Subject matter is
inherently contestable, and devolves into a matter of interest or perspective-based
branding. It is ultimately an unsuitable, even arbitrary basis on which to ground
a differential approach to the interpretation of treaties over time.
I do not want to unfairly impugn the arguments of these specialized courts or
scholars in grounding their differential approaches on the basis of subject matter.
Often they are absolutely right in identifying these treaties as having a special relationship to the parties and their intentions over time. Without doubt the results
of this approach have had an enormous and beneficial effect on international law
over the years, especially in the areas of human rights and humanitarian law.
However, I want to probe more deeply into why certain regimes are considered
‘special’. In other words, the foundational question is how to qualify what characteristics of these various treaties give judges and scholars pause in determining
whether the usual consent-oriented rules apply in the usual way.

B. Object and purpose
Rosalyn Higgins provides a somewhat more compelling explanation for the differential approach to treaty interpretation over time. According to Higgins, the
root criterion for assessing whether and how a treaty may be susceptible to change
over time is its specific object and purpose. She explains Judge Tanaka’s 1966
opinion in South West Africa on the basis of the centrality of protecting the human
person as an object of the mandate system.33 One might likewise explain the
supposed special nature of a territorial treaty by reference to its particular object
and purpose, which necessarily entails ‘the need for the stability of boundaries’.34
Unlike the subject-matter approach, this object and purpose approach rejects generalizing abstract types of treaties. Instead it analyses the propriety of applying the
various techniques of interpretation over time on a case-by-case basis, in light of
a particular treaty’s goals. And it has the advantage of being the only explanation
purely immanent in the Vienna rules themselves. Because object and purpose is
recognized in Article 31(1) of the VCLT, this approach explains variations in the

33 Higgins, ‘Time and the Law’, 519. For Higgins, subject matter cannot explain exempting
human rights provisions from a general presumption of static-interpretation: ‘[H]uman rights
provisions are not really random exceptions to a general rule. They are an application of a wider
principle—intention of the parties, reflected by reference to the objects and purpose—that guides
the law of treaties.’
34 Shaw, ‘Title, Control, and Closure?’, 761; Kohen, ‘The Decision on the Delimitation of the
Eritrea/Ethiopia Boundary’, 772; Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad) [1994] ICJ Rep 6, 37; Case
Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand) [1962] ICJ Rep 6, 34.
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weight afforded to the different factors listed at Article 31 by appeal to one of
those self-same factors.
There is no doubt that object and purpose is essential to the analysis of interpretation over time. That said, it is not a panacea. On its own, it constitutes an
unsatisfying touchstone for determining when and how a treaty should be capable
of change over time. The inquiry into object and purpose entails troubling doctrinal and conceptual ambiguities, and seems, moreover, fundamentally incomplete.
As a result, reliance on object and purpose alone risks obscuring some of the
most important considerations about a treaty germane to the question of change
over time.
The first problem concerns the long-standing doctrinal debate as to whether
a treaty has just one ‘object and purpose’ or whether it can have several. And if
several, are they all general, or can individual provisions have different objects and
purposes? On the one hand, some scholars insist that a treaty has only one object
and purpose, properly understood. In the emphatic words of Judge Anzilotti of
the Permanent Court of International Justice:
I do not see how it is possible to say that an article of a convention is clear until the subject
and aim of the convention have been ascertained, for the article only assumes its true
import in this convention and in relations thereto.35

Thus, according to Anzilotti, a treaty term cannot be understood except in light
of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole. It simply does not make sense,
on this view, to talk about the intent of the provision in isolation from the object
and purpose of the whole.36 Jan Klabbers concurs, adding that ‘when the notion
of object and purpose of a treaty is used to refer to single provisions of a treaty,
or when object and purpose becomes numerous objects and purposes, something valuable is lost’—specifically the idea of an overarching goal of the treaty,
against which reservations, modifications, and purported interpretations should
be measured.37
On the other hand, some commentators insist that treaties can have multiple,
and perhaps even divergent objects and purposes. Ian Sinclair states that ‘most
treaties have no single, undiluted object and purpose but a variety of differing
and possibly conflicting objects and purposes’.38 In this vein, the Appellate Body
of the WTO held in Shrimp–Turtle that the General Agreement on Tariffs and
35 Interpretation of the Convention of 1919 Concerning Employment of Women During the Night
[1932] PCIJ Rep Series A/B No 50, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anzilotti, 383. The older usage
‘subject and aim’ appears to have been one of several synonyms of ‘object and purpose’ that have
ultimately given way to the latter term. See Isabelle Buffard and Karl Zemanek, ‘The “Object and
Purpose” of a Treaty: An Enigma?’ (1998) 3 ARIEL 311, 317.
36 Buffard and Zemanek, ‘The “Object and Purpose” of a Treaty’, 342–3 contend that a treaty
has only a general object and purpose, and suggest that some articles may be essential to it while
others may not be (eg for purposes of reservations).
37 Jan Klabbers, ‘Treaties, Object and Purpose’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP 2012) [6], [7], [23].
38 See eg Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2nd edn, Manchester
University Press 1984) 130.
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Trade (GATT) has multiple objects and purposes in its varied provisions, and in
particular that the purposes of the General Exceptions clause at Article XX (here,
environmental protection) are separate and must be assessed separately from
the Treaty’s more general purposes (ie trade liberalization).39 According to the
Appellate Body, different provisions are included for different reasons, and these
reasons should not be subsumed into the general goals of the treaty.
The Shrimp–Turtle case usefully illustrates why the question of one or several
object(s) and purpose(s) matters. Framing the issue in caricatured form, Article
XX(g) is a lonely, but important, provision incorporating environmental protection (specifically the protection of ‘exhaustible natural resources’) in a treaty
otherwise mostly dedicated to trade liberalization. Assume, for convenience,
that environmental protection would be typical of the kind of object and purpose that could support evolutive interpretation, while the goal of trade liberalization would militate in favour of static interpretation along the principle of
contemporaneity—ie sticking to the bargain struck. If the GATT has only one
general object and purpose, it would be difficult to say that environmental protection is anything but an ancillary concern. Environmental considerations would
thus not legitimately affect the question of how the provision should be interpreted along the steady march of time (even as environmental law and science rapidly outpace understandings contemporaneous with the GATT’s promulgation).
On the other hand, if Article XX(g) has its own object and purpose, ‘environmental protection’, and this is taken to be the referent for determining how the treaty
should be interpreted over time, the picture looks very different.
The more conceptual problem is the level of abstraction at which to frame
object and purpose. Nuance in the framing of even a single object and purpose
can be decisive. The Iron Rhine arbitration is illustrative. There, the Tribunal held
that the boundary treaty at issue had an evolutive nature, in light of its object
and purpose. The treaty incorporated cross-border rights regarding the operation
and maintenance of a railway. The dispute concerned, inter alia, the scope of the
Netherlands’ obligation to maintain (and/or modernize) the railway over the long
term. The treaty’s object and purpose could be stated in more or less abstract
forms: for example, as simply ‘establishing a stable border’, or as ‘demarcating
the border while maintaining Belgium’s most efficient rail-access to Germany
in order to effect a stable boundary without undermining the economic cap
acity of either State’. The latter could be read into the former, broadly construed.
However, it only becomes clear that the treaty must be read as evolutive if its
object and purpose is construed in the latter complex form. If necessary maintenance were not considered part of the treaty’s object and purpose, Belgium could
have lost one of its central gains—an efficient rail link to Germany—thereby
undermining the future stability of the boundary settlement.40 Important as it is,
no bright line rule can realistically resolve this issue of abstraction; tribunals can
39 WTO-AB, US–Shrimp/Turtle, [114].
40 Arbitration Regarding the Iron Rhine (Ijzeren Rijn) Railway (Belgium v Netherlands) (2005) 27
RIAA 35, [80]–[84].
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only try to determine the full meaning of a treaty’s object(s) and purpose(s) on a
case-by-case basis.
Finally, beyond its potential indeterminacy, the inquiry into object and purpose does not necessarily exhaust all fundamental considerations relevant to interpretation over time. Even where a treaty’s goals are sufficiently determinate, the
interpreter must still ask how far the parties were willing to go to achieve their
goals. Given the centrality of consent to the interpretive process, it is important
to distinguish between the parties’ ends and their chosen means. Insofar as the
inquiry into object and purpose fails to take the parties’ level of commitment into
account, it cannot adequately explain how much weight such object and purpose
is due vis-à-vis the other factors in the Vienna rules.
Higgins is right to underscore the importance of object and purpose to questions of interpretation over time, as reflective of the parties’ intentions. And as
Klabbers rightly notes, the malleability of object and purpose as a consideration
in interpretation ‘is not necessarily a bad thing . . . as it opens up a space for polit
ical debate and discussion on the most desirable interpretation of a treaty’.41 But
the vagaries inherent in the concept dilute its analytical value for assessing the
particularly sensitive question of whether and how interpretation can bring about
treaty change over time. There are serious ambiguities about what goes into the
analysis, and an over-reliance on this one facet of interpretation risks leaving fundamental considerations aside.

C. Third party rights and reliance
A very different and promising recent proposal is grounded in private law. It
emphasizes a particular objective characteristic of certain treaties—the conferral
of rights on third parties, including individuals or other non-state actors. Anthea
Roberts has argued that the rules of interpretation should be specially tailored
when applied to treaties granting directly enforceable rights to non-state actors,
including a wide array of investment treaties and human rights conventions (particularly the ECHR).42 Roberts argues for a differential approach to such treaties
in light of their asymmetric nature. ‘Treaties that grant rights to nonstate actors,
such as human rights and investment treaties, do not share the symmetry between
those who hold the rights and those who can interpret them’, Roberts contends.43
Therefore, she suggests that care be taken in the application of doctrines like subsequent practice to protect the rights and legitimate expectations of third party
rights conferees: ‘The treaty parties may still be the masters of the treaty, but one
cannot assume no harm, no foul in accepting their interpretations of nonstate
actors’ rights.’44
41 Klabbers, ‘Treaties, Object and Purpose’, [22].
42 Anthea Roberts, ‘Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role
of States’ (2010) 104 AJIL 179, 181, 199.
43 Roberts, ‘Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation’, 202.
44 Roberts, ‘Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation’, 202.
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Roberts confines her analysis to the propriety of relying on subsequent practice in interpreting treaties that confer directly enforceable rights upon non-state
actors. She proposes that in the case of such treaties interpreters should keep in
mind both the interests of the rights-conferring states parties as ‘masters of the
treaty’, and at the same time the interests of the rights-conferees in the substance
of their rights, and in legal certainty as to the stability of that substance. A key
question for Roberts involves reliance—whether the third party has relied on
such rights, and when such reliance can vest. As such, Roberts argues, interpreters should still give weight to subsequent party agreement and practice, but in
a modified form that takes into account the asymmetry of interests inherent in
these treaties.45 Turning specifically to investment treaties, Roberts argues that
it is important to distinguish between three issues: scope (whether the subsequent practice supports an interpretation that expands or narrows rights); reason
ableness (whether the new interpretation appears to strain the text); and timing
(whether the subsequent practice established the new interpretation before or after
the investment was made, the alleged breach occurred, and any claim was filed,
in order to determine and weigh reliance). Roberts highlights these issues to prod
tribunals to consider subsequent practice in the interpretation of investment treat
ies, while paying due attention to the legitimate expectations of the investors to
whom these treaties grant rights.46
Roberts provides an insightful picture of how subsequent practice could be
tailored to take into account both state and investor interests in the interpretation
of investment treaties over time. However, as a general theory for distinguishing between types of treaties for the purposes of interpretation, this rights-based
explanation is potentially both over- and under-inclusive.
First, it is not clear that all rights-conferring treaties should be understood as
equally insulated or autonomous from the mastery of the parties. The mere fact
that a treaty grants rights to an individual does not imply, of itself, that states have
given up any of their mastery of the treaty—including their capacity to reinterpret
the treaty at will through subsequent agreement or practice. The question turns
upon what kind of rights are conferred, or more precisely, what kind of obligations
the states parties take on to confer and guarantee those rights. Roberts recognizes
that treaties conferring rights to individuals are due differential treatment, while
mere benefit-conferring treaties are not. And as she further acknowledges, third
party rights may sometimes be little more than mere benefits, conferred on the
tenuous basis of reciprocity by the other parties to the treaty. A diplomat’s rights
conferred by a diplomatic treaty are not easily equated with the rights of an investor under a BIT, which are distinct in turn from an individual’s fundamental
rights under a human rights treaty. These differences in character are highly material to the question of the continued vitality of party consent and intentions in
interpretation over time. The issue is how to determine whether such rights are
something more than benefits and to what extent any such difference should play
45 Roberts, ‘Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation’, 209.
46 Roberts, ‘Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation’, 209–15.
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a role in interpretation. Do the states agree to grant rights to an individual solely
as an aspect of their agreement inter se, or do they intend to grant rights to that
individual as an end in itself and thereby give up some of their capacity to interpret those rights away?
At the same time, despite its merits, this private law approach would prove
ultimately under-inclusive as a general account of differences in treaty type, mater
ial to the question of interpretation and change over time. In particular, we still
need to explain why a treaty norm that confers no third party rights may yet be
equally (or even more) insulated from subsequent party intentions and/or capable
of autonomous evolution over time—for example, treaty provisions concerning
the protection of the environment, the protection of civilians during armed conflict, or even the resolution of territorial disputes.
Roberts is correct that the incorporation of third party rights is crucial, and
indeed it often signals something deeper. Under the more general approach proposed here, the granting of directly enforceable rights to individuals or non-state
actors, with its attendant counterpart of granting a tribunal compulsory jurisdiction, should be taken as probative evidence that a treaty may require special treatment—that under these circumstances, ‘[t]he treaty parties may still be masters of
the treaty, but one cannot assume no harm, no foul in accepting their interpretations of nonstate actors’ rights’.47 From a more pragmatic (or realist) perspective,
such features may also raise our expectations that the treaty will be given special
treatment—especially where such jurisdiction is conferred upon a standing judicial body like the ECtHR or the IACtHR. But the interpreter must take care to
assess what kinds of rights the treaty confers, and how it confers them. I argue
that it is not the rights themselves doing the work, but the type of obligation the
states take on in granting and committing to ensure those rights.

II. The Nature of the Obligation
I accept the premise, shared by all the views canvassed above, that treaties are not
all the same, and that it is not always appropriate to apply the same techniques of
interpretation to different kinds of treaties—at least not in the same way. This is
especially true in the context of interpretation over time, which, in ascertaining
state ‘intentions’, necessarily implicates systemic issues of state consent and legal
certainty. The problem is that Article 31 of the VCLT does not provide for how
its component doctrines interrelate, or how they are to be weighed against one
another.48 On the one hand, the rules cannot be mechanically applied to derive
47 Roberts, ‘Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation’, 202.
48 ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries’ (1966) II ILC Ybk 219–20
(indicating that in general there is no hierarchy between the elements of Article 31 VCLT, but that
‘[a]ll the various elements, as they were present in any given case, would be thrown into the crucible, and their interaction would give rise to the legally relevant interpretation’); Richard Gardiner,
Treaty Interpretation (OUP 2008) 9.
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a ‘correct’ answer to interpretive questions (nor could any rules be expected to
do so). On the other hand, the rules cannot be taken as meaningless legalistic
justifications for achieving desired outcomes without doing imprudent violation
to the idea of international law as law, as well as its foundations in state consent.
The difficulty of differentiating between treaties for the purposes of interpretation
over time is to determine what factors are important to take into consideration in
applying the Vienna rules—without either reducing everything to outcomes (the
subject-matter approach), or boiling everything down to one aspect of the rules
(object and purpose).
I propose that a critical piece of this interpretive puzzle is the nature of the
norm under interpretation—in other words, the kind of obligation set up by the
parties to achieve their goals.49 The key question is whether a treaty provision
incorporates a merely reciprocal exchange of rights and duties between states,
or rather establishes a more durable kind of obligation, resilient against shifts
in party intention. Integral obligations represent the archetypal counterpart to
merely reciprocal obligations, while interdependent obligations lie somewhere in
between. As indicative of the states parties’ level of commitment, the nature of
a treaty obligation as reciprocal, integral, or interdependent is as relevant to the
interpretation of that norm over time as the object and purpose it seeks to achieve.

A.  Types of obligation in the law of treaties
Though absent from the VCLT’s general rule on interpretation, the distinction
between treaty norms according to type of obligation has a pedigree in the law
of treaties. The nature and extent of an obligation is a venerable, but perennially
under-appreciated and under-theorized, criterion for distinguishing between treat
ies or treaty norms—particularly because it was not expressly included in any
portion of the final VCLT.
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht already formulated the core idea as Second Rapporteur
on the Law of Treaties. He called upon the International Law Commission (ILC)
to distinguish between contractual and law-making treaties for the purpose of
successive treaty-making. According to Lauterpacht, treaties of the law-making
type, ‘affecting all members of the international community or which must be
deemed to have been concluded in the international interest’, would take prece
dence over merely contractual treaties in case of temporal conflict.50 In his view, a
later-in-time contractual treaty could not trump a conflicting law-making treaty
and would be invalid to whatever extent it conflicted with the prior instrument.
Succeeding Lauterpacht as Third Special Rapporteur, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice
set aside the language of contractual and law-making treaties, but extended the
49 See eg Fitzmaurice, ‘Dynamic (Evolutive) Interpretation of Treaties, Part I’; Malgosia
Fitzmaurice, ‘Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties’ in Dinah Shelton (ed), The Oxford Handbook
of International Human Rights Law (OUP 2013) 739, 742; Pauwelyn, ‘A Typology of Multilateral
Treaty Obligations’.
50 See Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘Report’ (1954) II ILC Ybk 156, draft art 16.
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idea at its root, envisioning distinctions among treaty norms meriting differential treatment. Rather than distinguishing between sweeping generalized types
of treaties, Fitzmaurice took a more fine-grained approach—reorienting the focus
towards the nature of particular treaty norms. He distinguished between norms
establishing reciprocal obligations, reflecting mere exchanges of rights and duties
between parties (akin to Lauterpacht’s ‘contractual treaties’), and those treaty
norms incorporating more absolute obligations (akin to instruments of public
law). Within the latter set, Fitzmaurice identified two types: those truly absolute
integral obligations and interdependent obligations, representing a kind of hybrid
between the integral and the reciprocal types.51
Fitzmaurice attached two significant legal issues to the distinction between
types of treaty obligations: one concerning the consequences of breach, and the
other concerning successive treaty-making. According to him, a party could
appropriately suspend or terminate a treaty in response to the other party’s
material breach of a reciprocal norm. Further, the parties could derogate from
a reciprocal treaty obligation through enacting a subsequent treaty on the same
matter. By contrast, it would be impermissible to respond to the breach of integral
norms with suspension or termination. Such norms as are found in the Genocide
Convention, to use Fitzmaurice’s example, are meant to bind all parties irrespect
ive of the behaviour of the other parties. They are meant to withstand violation,
and enforcement must occur through channels other than the mutual threat of
noncompliance.52 Similarly, unlike with reciprocal norms, any reciprocal treaty
conflicting with a prior integral norm would be invalid to the extent of their
contradiction.
It is important to see that the qualification of an obligation as reciprocal or integral does not depend on the number of parties to a treaty.53 A multilateral treaty
may well entail no more than a complex web of reciprocal obligations among its
parties, as in Fitzmaurice’s example of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations (VCDR).54 At the same time, a bilateral treaty could easily incorporate
integral obligations, as is arguably the case where a BIT accords substantive rights
and access to arbitration to third party individuals and non-state actors.55
Beyond reciprocal and integral norms, Fitzmaurice envisaged a third category
of interdependent obligations, for which the model was an arms control treaty.56
These fall somewhere in between reciprocal and integral norms. On the one hand,
because they depend on unanimous application, they are more like reciprocal
51 See Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘Third Report on the Law of Treaties’ (1958) UN Doc A/CN.4/115
and Corr.1, 27, arts 18–19, [2]; Fragmentation Report, [493(1)(d)].
52 Fitzmaurice, ‘Third Report on the Law of Treaties’. For further historical background,
see Surabhi Ranganathan, ‘Between Philosophy and Anxiety? The Early International Law
Commission, Treaty Conflict and the Project of International Law’ (2013) 83 BYBIL 82.
53 Fitzmaurice, ‘Third Report on the Law of Treaties’, arts 18–19, [2].
54 Fitzmaurice, ‘Third Report on the Law of Treaties’, arts 18–19, [2]. See also Pauwelyn, ‘A
Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations’, 928–9 (characterizing the GATT as a web of reciprocal commitments).
55 See Roberts, ‘Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation’. Cf RosInvest, [40].
56 Fitzmaurice, ‘Third Report on the Law of Treaties’, arts 18–19, [2].
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obligations for purposes of determining the consequences of material breach—the
parties only agree to abide by this kind of obligation insofar as the others all do
the same. Each party understands that if any party began to violate the treaty
by stockpiling the controlled weapon, no party would continue to see itself as
bound. However, with respect to successive treaties, interdependent norms are
more like integral obligations. Precisely because any slippage by one party would
likely engender slippage by all the other parties (rendering the treaty norm a dead
letter), Fitzmaurice believed that any inter se agreement between some of the parties cutting against the object of the interdependent norm would be null and void.
The interdependent treaty would take absolute priority over any subsequent treat
ies between only some of the parties.57
Here at last is a distinction that gets to the heart of the issue of differential
treatment in treaty interpretation over time—if not, perhaps, ascribed such a purpose by Fitzmaurice himself. By reorienting focus away from the treaty’s object
and purpose or subject matter, the tripartite distinction between reciprocal, integral, and interdependent obligations affords more solid ground for explaining why
some treaties attain a degree of autonomy from the parties in a manner consistent
with the core notion of state consent. By focusing on the modalities by which
the parties agree to take on obligations giving effect to their diverse objects and
purposes, it becomes easier to account for (and argue for) differences in approach
to the interpretation of different kinds of treaties over time.
In stark terms, differences in type of obligation—typified in terms of the extent
to which states consent to be bound—should have a strong bearing on the relative weight and appropriate contours of the component rules of Article 31 VCLT.
Type of obligation, in other words, should constitute an authentic criterion in the
interpretation of treaties over time.
It is important to note that Fitzmaurice’s strong vision of the role of the distinction, with regard to the consequences of breach and for resolving conflicts
between successive treaties, is not necessarily reflected in current law. The last
Special Rapporteur on the law of treaties, Sir Humphrey Waldock, abandoned
the distinction in his final reports. He considered the notion overly complicated,
and insufficiently grounded in state practice.58 The final VCLT elided any express
reference to the distinction between types of obligation.59 But Waldock’s abandonment of the distinction was not the end of the story. The type of obligation
has retained more subtle relevance in the VCLT, and, more recently, the ILC has
returned to the distinction for the purposes of state responsibility and addressing
problems of successive treaties through interpretation.60
First, it bears noting that the ghost of the distinction can be felt throughout the
final VCLT. Most obviously, the recognition of a limited set of hierarchical norms
(jus cogens) ensures that certain integral norms like those in Fitzmaurice’s preferred
57
58
59
60

Fitzmaurice, ‘Third Report on the Law of Treaties’, arts 18–19, [2].
Humphrey Waldock, ‘Second Report’ (1963) II ILC Ybk [28]–[30].
Waldock, ‘Second Report’, 58–60, [20]–[21], [25]–[30].
Fitzmaurice, ‘Dynamic (Evolutive) Interpretation of Treaties, Part I’.
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example—the Genocide Convention—will get special treatment.61 Moreover,
Joost Pauwelyn finds additional traces of the idea.62 He notes that Article 60(5)
on material breach bars termination or suspension in response to breach of a
wider set of integral norms than those codifying jus cogens—ie provisions relating to the ‘protection of the human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian character’.63 And with regard to successive treaties, Article 40(1)(b)(i)
bans (without invalidating) inter se modifications among only some parties to a
multilateral treaty when they ‘affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their rights
under the treaty or the performance of their obligations’; and Article 40(1)(b)(ii)
prohibits inter se modifications that relate to ‘a provision, derogation from which
is incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty
as whole’. Thus, between these two provisions, it would be impermissible in most
cases for only some parties to a multilateral treaty to contract around any norm
that could properly be called integral. To do so would likely undercut the rights of
others or undermine the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole, if not both.
Finally, Article 58 provides similar rules regarding the inter se termination or
suspension of treaties.64
More recently the ILC’s work on state responsibility and fragmentation has
breathed new life into the idea of distinguishing between abstract types of obligation. The ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility recognize a difference, for
the purposes of standing, between bilateral (or reciprocal) obligations, and multilateral obligations owed to all the parties of a particular regime (erga omnes partes)
or to the international community as a whole (erga omnes).65
But it was the Fragmentation Report that did the most to resuscitate the distinction between reciprocal, integral, and interdependent norms in the context
of successive treaties. The Report turned to the distinction not for the purpose of
determining which treaties would get ‘hard’ priority in the sense of invalidating
conflicting instruments, but rather for the ‘softer’ purpose of harmonizing potentially conflicting treaties through interpretation. Most of the time, according to
the Report, harmonization turns on interpretive canons like lex posterior and lex
specialis—it is not that one treaty invalidates the other, but rather that the treaty
that is later in time, or more specific, gets precedence. However, according to
the Report, the picture changes in cases of potential conflict between reciprocal
and more absolute types of treaty obligation. In such situations, the nature of
the norm should be taken into consideration as a counterweight to the normal
canons of lex posterior and lex specialis, because the parties’ choice to establish an
integral norm provides in and of itself a good reason to give interpretive priority to
that norm. All else being equal, the reciprocal should be interpreted to be in line
with the integral or interdependent (as much as possible), and not the other way
61 Article 53 VCLT.
62 Pauwelyn, ‘A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations’, 912.
63 Article 60(5) VCLT.
64 Article 58 VCLT.
65 ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ (2001)
UN Doc A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1, arts 42(b), 48, and commentary.
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around.66 The Report noted that ‘[n]othing has undermined Fitzmaurice’s original
point’: that certain norms in ‘human rights and humanitarian law treaties, (as well
as for example environmental treaties) form a special class of non-bilateral (“integral” or “interdependent”) instruments that cannot be operated through the same
techniques as “ordinary” treaties creating bilateral relationships’.67
The point to take from all this is that states try to achieve a wide variety of goals
through international treaties, and in so doing they agree to take on very different kinds of obligations—even within a single instrument. The type of obligation
they decide to take on has important consequences for their continued mastery
over the treaty. It seems relatively unproblematic that states retain their mastery
over treaty norms incorporating reciprocal obligations, being free to modify or
replace them through mutual agreement, or to suspend or terminate them in
response to one another’s breach. On the other hand, it is much less clear that
they maintain such mastery with regard to more absolute types of treaty norms
(whether interdependent or integral, erga omnes partes or erga omnes). To the contrary, it appears that by incorporating such obligations states establish norms over
and above themselves that are beyond their grasp. And interdependent norms lie
somewhere in between. The issue at the heart of the distinction between types
of treaty obligation is the relevance of state consent to the continued vitality of a
treaty norm. It is this issue also that makes the distinction relevant to problems of
interpretation over time.

B.  Categories of obligation and interpretation over time
For many of the same systemic reasons underlying its relevance throughout the
law of treaties, Fitzmaurice’s distinction between types of obligations should be an
important consideration in the process of treaty interpretation—particularly with
regard to whether and how such interpretation may bring about treaty change
over time. The nature of a treaty obligation is germane to at least three interpretive questions that are left unresolved by the text of Article 31 of the VCLT: (1)
whether one or another technique of interpretation over time is appropriate at all
in a particular case; (2) how liberally and expansively such dynamic techniques
should be applied; and (3) how to weigh such doctrines against the other elements of the Vienna rules. The point here is both descriptive and normative. I am
suggesting that distinguishing between reciprocal, integral, and interdependent
norms helps both to explain the instincts of international adjudicators in a wide
variety of cases, and to justify drawing distinctions between types of treaty norms
for the purposes of interpretation over time in certain circumstances.
Questions of dynamic interpretation over time on the basis of the parties’ subsequent practice or the purported evolutionary character of a treaty norm strongly
implicate the core notion of state consent undergirding the entire law of treaties.
Here, as with questions of material breach or harmonizing successive treaties, the
66 Fragmentation Report, [407].

67 Fragmentation Report, 250.
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question of the extent to which the parties agreed to be bound should be carefully
assessed. As noted above, states can take on different kinds of obligations in establishing their joint projects. In acceding to mere reciprocal norms, states agree to a
pseudo-contractual exchange of rights and duties, which may be enforced by retaliatory suspension or termination, or abrogated by successive treaty-making. With integral norms, states agree to create obligations meant to withstand violations and the
changing whims of the parties. This distinction is vital to the question of whether
and how the parties can exercise their interpretive authority to develop, augment, or
restrict a treaty’s provisions, as well as the question of whether and to what extent
such provisions are amenable to autonomous change over time.
Consider the weight assigned to the subsequent practice of the parties. As
regards an integral norm, the nature of the obligation would seem to weigh
against an interpretation on the basis of subsequent practice that cuts against
the object and purpose of a treaty. For example, it would seem uncomfortable
(and unlikely) for the ECtHR to narrow an integral rights protection provision
in the ECHR on the basis of the subsequent practice of the parties.68 In the case
of Demir & Baykara v Turkey, the Court relied on the overwhelming subsequent
practice of the parties, inter alia, to justify expanding ECHR Article 11 (freedom
of association) to include the rights of municipal civil servants to unionize, and
the right of all unions to bargain collectively. But imagine the situation had been
the reverse—that Article 11 had clearly included the rights of public workers in
its ambit at the outset, but a majority of states had subsequently banned public
worker unionization (without any protest by the minority). There would seem to
be something wrong with relying on such conduct to establish a restrictive interpretation of the Convention. To the contrary, this behaviour would look more like
violations of the freedom of association en masse. The mere fact that these violations occurred in a group, without protest by the other states parties, should not
necessarily transform them into the grounds of a new authoritative interpretation
of the law.69
Both the original case and my hypothetical turned on interpreting the same
integral obligation to respect the freedom of association—the difference is the
conformity of the subsequent practice to the object and purpose of an integral
treaty norm meant to protect individual rights from encroachment by the states
parties. Here the integral nature of the norm hews toward privileging object and
purpose over subsequent practice.70 On the other hand, the object and purpose
68 See Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘Restrictive Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties in the
Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2003) 14 EJIL 529, 535–6. Cf
Mangouras v Spain (2012) 54 EHRR 25.
69 Such a restrictive interpretation would not be impossible in the case of integral norms. But in
such cases arguments for a restrictive interpretation based on party practice should be viewed quite
a bit more sceptically and subjected to more rigorous evidentiary standards than in cases of merely
reciprocal obligations: Fitzmaurice, ‘Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties’, 742.
70 Fitzmaurice, ‘Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties’, 742 (noting that the integral nature
of human rights treaties seems to lead to ‘reductions in the importance of the actual text of the
treaty in relation to other factors relevant to interpretation—in particular enhancing the import
ance of the object and purpose of the treaty’).
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may not have proven so decisive in the case of a treaty conferring reciprocal obligations (for example, the VCDR). If the parties remain masters of the treaty, as
with merely reciprocal norms, then it is not clear that a court’s determination of
the object and purpose of the treaty should defeat evidence of the parties mutually
changing intent about the meaning of the agreement—even if that subsequent
intent seems to cut against the treaty’s original object. And of course the issue will
not always be clear, as in the more borderline case of investor rights.71
The consequences of this analysis for interdependent norms lie, as always, somewhere in the middle. There is reason to be cautious in labelling restrictive party
practice as breaches en masse rather than evidence of a narrow interpretation. By
contrast to integral norms, which are meant to withstand treaty breach, interdependent norms permit suspension and termination by all parties in the case of any
one party’s material breach. Thus, with interdependent norms, a clearly common
practice evidencing the parties’ agreement would have to be given effect, as failing to do so could have the farcical consequence of vitiating the treaty entirely.
But recalling that such norms are supposed to withstand later in time conflicting
treaties or inter se modifications, there is reason to be especially watchful for real
commonality, consistency, and concordance in the parties’ practice in terms of
evidence (as compared to reciprocal norms)—for example by subjecting claims
based on limited practice plus acquiescence to heightened scrutiny.
Distinguishing between reciprocal, integral, and interdependent norms further
helps us explain (and justify) the instincts of judges and arbitrators in singling out
certain kinds of treaties as specially capable of autonomous evolution. A handful of cases expressly draw our attention to the nature of the obligations at issue.
Beyond exhorting the red herring of subject matter or the incomplete explanation
of object and purpose, the IACtHR and ECtHR have both at times emphasized
the integral nature of the treaty norms under their charge in adopting an evolutionary approach to interpretation.72 The former stressed that such instruments
‘are not multilateral treaties of the traditional type concluded to accomplish the
reciprocal exchange of rights for the mutual benefit of the contracting States’,73
concluding that ‘human rights treaties are living instruments whose interpretation
must consider the changes over time and present-day conditions’.74 By contrast,
the Tribunal in RosInvest held that the obligations entailed by the UK–Soviet BIT
were not amenable to autonomous evolution over time, absent evidence of the parties’ consent, by specific appeal to their merely reciprocal nature. Acknowledging
the propriety of evolutive interpretation for human rights conventions like the
ECHR, the RosInvest Tribunal strongly questioned ‘whether these special kinds
of multilateral treaty are at all analogous to bilateral engagements regulating a
particular area of the relations between one Party and the other’. According to the

71
72
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See Roberts, ‘Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation’.
Loizidou; Information on Consular Assistance, [114].
Effect of Reservations, [29].
Information on Consular Assistance, [114].
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Tribunal, the BIT reflected merely ‘a (reciprocal) bargain and the Parties must be
held to what they agreed to, but not more, or less’.75
We need not agree that the matter is as cut and dried as portrayed in these cases
(ie that integral norms are capable of evolution but reciprocal norms are not). But
what should be clear is that the nature of the obligation has an important bearing
on the extent to which we can plausibly view a treaty norm as insulated from the
mastery of the parties. Absolute obligations are more insulated from the changing will of the parties (reducing the weight assigned to subsequent practice that
deviates from the treaty’s object and purpose), and are potentially more amenable
to autonomous evolution (again in light of its object and purpose). Reciprocal
obligations are, by contrast, more amenable to change over time on the basis of
the parties’ subsequent agreement and practice, but less easily presumed capable
of autonomous evolution absent party action. Whether or not we agree in particular instances, the distinction provides a helpful explanation for the tendency of
international courts and tribunals to afford special treatment to certain kinds of
treaties. Even more importantly, it provides a principled basis for accounting for
difference going forward.
While the nature of a treaty obligation is highly material to the question of
interpretation over time, it should be emphasized that it is not a panacea. It is no
more than one consideration among many, and it is crucial not to give too much
weight to any one factor. Real cases are complicated. Most disputes over treaty
interpretation in public international law involve a great many factors weighing
in different directions, which are generally not easily or mechanically resolved.
Take for example the border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia, arbitrated in
2002.76 One aspect of that dispute concerned a portion of the treaty delineating
the border between those two countries. The Tribunal had to determine whether
the border had shifted from the line envisioned in the treaty on the basis of the
subsequent practice of the two states. It ultimately held that the practice of the
parties had modified the treaty border, but for present purposes the result is less
important than the analysis.
Were the relevant treaty provisions simply reciprocal in nature, it would have
been easy to come to the Tribunal’s conclusion. But a boundary treaty of this type
is inherently integral, constituting an objective and stable boundary to be respected
by all states in the international community—not just the signatories.77 The integral nature of such obligations necessitates a measure of caution in considering
the subsequent practice of the parties, in appreciation of the treaty’s object and
purpose.
At first glance, there appears to have been a real tension between the object
and purpose of the treaty and the subsequent practice of the parties. As with any
75 RosInvest, [40].
76 Decision Regarding the Delimitation of the Border between Eritrea and Ethiopia (2002) 25 RIAA
83, [4.60].
77 See Shaw, ‘Title, Control, and Closure?’, 761; Kohen, ‘The Decision on the Delimitation of
the Eritrea/Ethiopia Boundary’, 767, 772.

226

Accounting for Difference in Treaty Interpretation Over Time

border treaty, a major aspect of the agreement’s object and purpose is the stability and finality of the border, in the interest of peace. And yet the practice of the
parties seemed to indicate that for some time Ethiopia had treated as its own
a significantly populated rural township situated on Eritrea’s side of the treaty
line, to no apparent protest by the latter, as well as treating the residents there as
its own nationals for various administrative purposes.78 Framed in the abstract,
modifying the treaty line to take party practice into account might seem to cut
against the object and purpose of stability of boundaries. However, in full view
of the current situation—admittedly resulting from the parties’ practices—the
demands of object and purpose appear more ambivalent. By the time of arbitration, a reversion to the textual boundary would have also been highly disruptive
and destabilizing, imposing an overnight change in territorial and administrative
status on the residents of the disputed township, with unclear effects on their
personal status.
The integral nature of the boundary provision only goes so far in resolving
these thorny interpretive questions. It hews toward taking the treaty’s object and
purpose particularly seriously in assigning weight to the subsequent practice of
the parties; but insofar as object and purpose proves ambivalent, the relevance of
subsequent practice becomes an increasingly open question. The Tribunal ultim
ately decided that the boundary had changed, and unsurprisingly the result was
controversial.79 But more importantly, for present purposes, the example underscores the complexity of the interpretive process, in which the nature of a treaty
obligation plays an important but certainly not decisive part.
The most we can say is that appreciating the type of obligation is critical to
the process of treaty interpretation, just as it is for assessing the consequences
of material breach or successive treaty-making. And indeed the concept helps
account for the instincts of international courts and tribunals in a wide variety of
cases. This consideration helps us navigate among the various doctrines comprising the Vienna rules, especially in determining their appropriate scope and weight
vis-à-vis one another in particular cases. But as the Ethiopia–Eritrea case shows,
this consideration should not be taken as a trump. It cannot provide mechanical
answers to complex interpretive questions any more than the other canons codified at Article 31 of the VCLT. It is a crucial consideration, given the centrality
of state consent in the interpretive process, but it is not an all-encompassing one.

Conclusion
The practice of treaty interpretation demonstrates that adjudicators occasionally feel compelled to draw critical distinctions between types of treaties. While
78 Eritrea/Ethiopia, [4.73]–[4.78].
79 Compare Kohen, ‘The Decision on the Delimitation of the Eritrea/Ethiopia Boundary’
(criticizing the Tribunal’s reasoning) with Shaw, ‘Title, Control, and Closure?’ (taking a
sympathetic view).
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the basic insight at work in such cases is often compelling, the justifications and
explanations proffered for such differential treatment have thus far proven unsatisfactory or incomplete from the perspective of general international law. In this
chapter I have argued that the practice of differential treatment is indeed justifiable and can be accounted for within the law of treaties.
In accounting for difference in treaty interpretation over time, the crucial consideration ought to be the nature of the obligation under interpretation. Is the
provision merely a reciprocal exchange of rights and obligations? Or is it a more
absolute integral or interdependent norm? Just as the nature of a norm bears on
the consequences of material breach, or the resolution of conflicts between successive treaties, I have argued that the nature of an obligation is germane to determining how to interpret a treaty over time, especially as regards the possibility
and legitimate extent of interpretive change. What these questions share is a common concern with the continued vitality of state consent, or, put another way, the
parties’ mastery over their treaties.
One important consequence of my account is that different norms in the same
treaty may be subject to different interpretive yardsticks. This certainly complicates the task of interpretation, but it is a complication worth internalizing.
Integral and interdependent norms are not especially common, and it is likely they
will be found packaged in large multilateral treaties along with various reciprocal
obligations. If it is correct that distinguishing between these types of obligations
matters in the abstract, it would be a serious mistake to pave over such differences
by assuming that all provisions of a particular treaty are of the same type.
Finally, it remains to be acknowledged that drawing legally significant distinctions between types of obligations will not be completely free of problems,
particularly as regards classifying norms in particular treaties. Even if one accepts
the value of such distinctions in the abstract, it will often be unclear and disputable whether a treaty norm is really best classified as reciprocal, integral, or
interdependent. This short chapter is not the place for a comprehensive analysis of
that evidentiary question. Suffice it to say that the question should not be simply
reduced to subjectivity; the nature of a treaty obligation need not be entirely in
the eye of the beholder. While express language will likely be rare, interpreters
should look to objective indicia of the parties’ level of commitment. Does the
treaty permit parties to make reservations or interpretive declarations? Does it
express particular consequences for material breach (as with most GATT commitments) or successive treaty-making (as with Article 103 of the UN Charter,
which declares the Charter’s superiority over conflicting later-in-time treaties)?
Does it envision compulsory international adjudication? Does it grant rights to
third parties, along with the means to enforce them? This list is of course not
exhaustive, but affirmative answers to any of the above will be probative evidence
that the parties intended to create something more than merely reciprocal obligations susceptible to easy derogation or retaliatory breach.
I hope to have shown that temporal problems in the interpretation of treaties
should not be decided on the basis of their object and purpose alone, any more
than by recourse to abstract generalizations about their subject matter. Especially

228

Accounting for Difference in Treaty Interpretation Over Time

in light of the voluntaristic roots of the law of treaties, the interpreter must also
take into account the extent to which the parties were willing to commit to achieving their ends. But I do not suggest that simply doing so will resolve such temporal
problems by yielding a ‘correct’ interpretation. Like any canon of interpretation,
thinking in terms of types of obligation can only help guide the interpreter toward
a right, or at least legitimate, answer. And of course there will always be disputes
about whether a norm is really reciprocal or integral, and how much weight this
factor should ultimately have. In the final analysis, the application of all such
rules will always require judgment.80 Insofar as such judgment can never be fully
mechanized, the art of interpretation is to determine when the rules apply, and to
give them appropriate weight vis-à-vis one another in particular cases.

80 See Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental Problems
(Praeger 1950) xv.

